Search results for "Exclusive dealing"
showing 4 items of 4 documents
Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers
2005
We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a…
The tradeoffs between retail service and exclusivity in distribution: Welfare and policy implications
2006
Abstract This paper examines the welfare tradeoffs between retail service and exclusivity in distribution in a successive duopoly with differentiated retailers. A simple two-stage game is developed to model quantity and retail service competition under two situations, one where retailers operate under exclusivity and one where retailers can sell both products. It is shown that welfare is higher under exclusivity in distribution when the transfer price without exclusivity exceeds that under exclusivity and intra-product and in-store competition are intense. Our findings call for a detailed analysis of the antitrust treatment of exclusive dealing when interrelated with the provision of retail…
Networks of manufacturers and retailers
2011
We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution & non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution & exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a dif…
Product Line Choice in Retail Duopoly
2011
This paper develops a successive duopoly model to identify conditions under which differentiated retailers that compete in quantities, when deciding on the range of brands to offer, will carry overlapping product lines. They will do so when retail margins on each brand are not too asymmetric. Otherwise, the less profitable brand is foreclosed from the market. It is shown that welfare increases if the upstream industry is perfectly competitive, even though fewer brands may be sold. With price competition though, exclusive dealing arises when retailers are not too differentiated and in-store competition is sufficiently intense.